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Abstract 
There has recently been much hand-wringing and discussion about the global decline of 
democracy and liberal values. This debate is especially acute in Southeast Asia, where 
many recently democratized states appear to be back-sliding into authoritarianism and 
embracing illiberal values. In Indonesia, this can be observed in the increasingly influential 
role played by hard-line Islamic groups in shaping state policy, and concessions made by 
politicians to such groups, such as proposed anti-LGBT legislation. The state has also 
begun to encroach on the public sphere in worrying ways. While this does pose some fears 
about the future of liberal values in the country, this article argues that it is not an 
unexpected turn of events in a socially conservative country with under-developed 
institutions and weak rule of law that is working through the challenges of economic and 
political development. Rather, placing democratization on a pedestal and viewing it as a 
cure-all back in the 1990s created unrealistic expectations for what democracy was and 
what it could do. It minimized the complex, nuanced nature of how young democracies 
would actually struggle to balance the interests of a wide range of social actors, or that the 
beliefs and values underpinning democratic systems might change over time. What we are 
witnessing in Indonesia, and in the larger regional and global context, is thus not the death 
of democracy but the messy guts of the democratic process in action. 
Introduction 
 Indonesia has often been viewed as a 
democratizing success story, with the New 
     
    
     
York Times calling it a “role model for 
democracy” in 20141 and Freedom House
conferring it the status of “Free” in 2006.2 
1 Cochrane, Joe. 2014. “In Southeast Asia, Indonesia Is an Unlikely Role Model for Democracy.” New York 
Times, September 4. 
2 Freedom House, 2006 Country Report (Indonesia). Can be accessed here. https://freedomhouse.org/report/ 
freedom-world/2006/indonesia. While Freedom House’s rating system for press freedoms and civil liberties is 





     
   
  
  
   
 
   
    
    
  
  





   
    
  
  
   
   
    
   
    
  
     




   
  
    
     
   
  
  
    
   
       
    
        
     
    
   
   
      
   
    
     
   
     
   
    
    
  
      
  
      
   
  
    
  
      




THE CREEPING HAND OF THE STATE
Some observers, however, have recently 
begun to wonder if the country is back-
sliding into authoritarian tendencies, while
its political class indulges in divisive
identity politics. In support of this they cite
recent legislation designed to criminalize
homosexuality, the jailing of Jakarta’s
former governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama
(commonly known as Ahok) on blasphemy 
charges, and the increasingly important role
conservative Islamist movements are
playing in shaping state policy. The rise of 
illiberal social forces, coupled with an 
expansion of state power is especially 
problematic in young democracies like
Indonesia, which often have under
3 
-
developed institutions, inefficient civil
services, and weak rule of law. This
combination of structural weaknesses
exposes developing democracies to the
influence of illiberal populist movements
and opportunistic demagogues with 
authoritarian tendencies. Elements of this
process are clearly underway not only in 
Indonesia, but in the Philippines, the United 
States, Brazil and Hungary to name just a
few examples. Some have even wondered if 
this marks an irreversible democratic
decline in the world.4
 This  article  argues  that  current  
trends in Indonesia do not represent the
death of democracy, although they may 
indicate a repudiation of liberal, Western-
style democracy. Democratization has often 
been thought of as uni-linear and 
intrinsically good, when in practice it is
JAMES GUILD 
much more nuanced and complex. In the
past several decades, the literature on 
democratization has sought to portray it as a
self-evidently desirable normative ideal
toward which societies should strive by 
embracing liberal values and enshrining 
them in a free and open representative
political system. The primary failing of this
approach is that it does not account for the
fact that democracy simply promises to give
the people a voice. It does not promise that
the voice they choose will reflect Western 
ideas of universal values, or that those
values will remain static.  
The creeping illiberalism and 
expansion of the state’s coercive power in 
Indonesia is not conclusive evidence that
democracy there has entered an irreversible
decline – in fact, this is not an unexpected 
example of what the democratic process
would be expected to look like in a socially 
conservative state that is still working to 
develop its democratic institutions and 
locate a workable balance between 
individual freedoms and state control. In the
Indonesian context, democracy is a far-cry 
from the normative, liberal ideal that has
formed the basis of much writing and 
debate on the subject in the past. It has
instead assumed the form of a messy and 
often contradictory process by which a
diverse set of stakeholders compete with 
one another to advance their agendas, 
interests and values.  
3 For a recent example of this back-sliding see Power, Tom. 2018. “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn.” New 
Mandala, October 9. 
4 Rose, Gideon. 2018. “Is Democracy Dying?” Foreign Affairs. May/June. 
One consequence of this process is
that conservative elements of society with 
6
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THE CREEPING HAND OF THE STATE
illiberal beliefs and values are finding 
success in influencing the direction of state
policy through democratic mechanisms. The
process is also demonstrating that a
democratic society may be willing to allow
the state to infringe on certain liberties and 
freedoms in exchange for the promise of 
stability. This does not mean that democracy 
is failing but that the system of governance
it produces is more dynamic, and more
context-driven than is sometimes acknowl-
edged. Indonesia’s ongoing efforts to walk 
the tight-rope of democratization highlights
some of the challenges that young 
democracies struggle with and helps explain 
why democracy in the country is not
conforming to the ideal version that some
observers once expected.  
This analysis begins with a broad 
discussion of the literature on democrati-
zation in the post-Cold War period, and how
that literature has struggled to reconcile
itself with a global democratic recession. It
will then move to a discussion of 
democratization in Southeast Asia, with 
special attention paid to the way in which 
the idea of “Asian Values” informed the
debate prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, 
before moving onto an evaluation of how
democracy has fared in the region. Having 
established this context and background, the
paper will then narrow its focus to a detailed 
case study of Indonesia’s democratization, 
with particular attention paid to the process
by which different stakeholders are
competing in the democratic space to work 
JAMES GUILD 
out a balance of power that reflects
underlying social and political conflicts, and 
why this process may appear like a
democratic retreat or authoritarian regres-
sion even if that is not necessarily so.  
Democratization in a Post-Cold War
World
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1991, it appeared self-evident to some
scholars that there was no longer any 
serious challenger to the dominance of a
liberal democratic system of governance. It
was in this year that Samuel Huntington 
published The Third Wave: Democratization 
in the Late Twentieth Century in which he
noted that, after Portugal became a
democracy in 1974, the world experienced a
“wave” of authoritarian regimes giving way 
to democratic systems of government in 
Africa, Latin America, Europe and Asia. 
5Francis Fukuyama famously wondered if 
we had reached “the end point of mankind’s
ideological evolution and the univer-
salization of Western liberal democracy as
the final form of human government.”6 
5 Huntington, Samuel. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Oklahoma:
University of Oklahoma Press. 
6 Fukuyama, Francis. Summer 1989. “The End of History?” The National Interest. 
It has been over two decades since
this fervor for democratization began to 
reach its apex, and the optimistic mood of 
the 1990s has soured somewhat since then. 
It has been noted that many of the regimes
that transitioned to democracy during the
“third wave” did so only superficially, and 
soon reverted back to a kind of semi-
authoritarianism cloaked in rhetorical
appeals to democratic ideals. The United 
7





   
   
    
    
    
  
   
    
 
   
 
    
  
    
  
    
    
  
   
     
  
       
   
    




    
     
    
  
 
    
   
    
  
   




   
    
     
      
  
   
    
    
   
  
  
   
  
  







THE CREEPING HAND OF THE STATE JAMES GUILD 
States’ attempt to bring democracy through 
force to Iraq was an unmitigated disaster 
and with the election of Donald Trump, 
many think pieces and books have recently 
appeared wondering if perhaps the liberal
democratic order is dead.7 Foreign Affairs
devoted an entire recent issue to the
question of what the liberal order was and 
whether or not we are losing it.8 
Larry Diamond, the editor of the
Journal of Democracy, the establishment of 
which in 1990 reflected prevailing beliefs in 
the inertia of democratic progress, recently 
published an article entitled “Facing Up to 
the Democratic Recession” in which he
acknowledged that many of the early 
assumptions about the forces of demo-
cratization were incomplete and overly 
optimistic.9 While still maintaining that
democracy as an ideal is superior to all
others, Diamond admits that many 
democratic states that transitioned during 
the third wave remain illiberal and unstable.  
Fukuyama has likewise modified his
earlier optimism, writing that democracy as
a normative ideal alone is not sufficient to 
sustain the transition to a functional
democratic political system.10 Equally, if not
more important, is the quality and design of 
that system. Transitioning to democracy 
without strong institutions can actually 
weaken the quality of governance, an 
observation with high explanatory power 
when used to make sense of the global
democratic recession that is underway.  
This see-sawing reveals just how
broadly the term “democracy” has been 
used over the years, invoked frequently but
rarely defined with precision. In this essay 
democracy, as a normative ideal rather than 
a set of clearly defined procedures and 
institutions, is the belief that a group of 
people (generally the majority) collectively 
ought to decide the direction their society 
takes.11 Schumpeter proposed that the best
way for realizing this collective decision-
making was through procedural means, 
namely “institutional arrangements for 
arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the
people’s vote.”12 
7 See Deneen, Patrick J. Why Liberalism Failed. Dartmouth: Yale University Press; Traub, James. 2018. 
“Democracy is Dying by Natural Causes.” Foreign Policy, March 1; Galston, William A. 2018. “The populist
challenge to liberal democracy.” Brookings Report, April 17; Ikenberry, G. John. 2018. “The End of Liberal
International Order?” International Affairs 94 (1), 7-23. 
8 See the March 2017 issue of Foreign Affairs. “What Was the Liberal Order? The World We May Be Losing.”
9 Diamond, Larry. January 2015. “Facing up to the Democratic Recession.” Journal of Democracy 26 (1):
141-155. 
10 Fukuyama, Francis. January 2015. “Why is Democracy Performing so Poorly?” Journal of Democracy 26 (1):
11-20.  
11 This is the definition used by Tom Christiano in the “Democracy” chapter of the Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, published on July 27, 2006. It can be accessed here https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/
and contains a thorough discussion of current trends and controversies in the study of democratic theory. 
12 Schumpeter, Joseph. 1943. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen and Unwin), p 269. 
8
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This has become perhaps
the most commonly held definition used by 
social scientists. In liberal democratic
theory, the ideal institutional arrangement
for achieving this normative ideal is
something similar to the type of liberal
democracy practiced by the United States -
  
    
    
     
    
   
    
  
     
   
   
   
     
   
       
    
   
  
  
   
  
    
     
  
  
      
     
  
 
   
       
    
   
  
   
  
    
   
  
  
      
  
    
   
   
  
 
     
  
   







   
  
  
THE CREEPING HAND OF THE STATE JAMES GUILD 
one that guarantees certain individual
liberties and rights, especially those that are
conducive to a free market capitalist
economy.13 It was this notion of Western-
style liberal democracy that informed much 
of the triumphalism of the 1990s.   
If one drills down deeper into the
literature on democratic theory, however, 
there are a number of scholars who have
taken a more nuanced approach to the
concept, noting that both the institutional
and procedural designs of democracies, as
well as the beliefs and values they reflect, 
can take many different forms.14 Moreover, 
it is entirely possible that the best political
decision (that is the best policy outcome) 
could be arrived at in an undemocratic
fashion, by elite consensus or even author-
itarian means. Democratic theory struggles
to definitively say which is more important:
achieving the optimal result, or preserving 
the participatory nature of the democratic
process.15 While scholars in the US
championed the triumph of liberal demo-
cracy in the post-Cold War era, Southeast
Asia was the scene of a more nuanced 
debate about the concept, as the region 
struggled to reconcile competing visions of 
democracy, economic growth and gov-
ernance.  
13 Democracy and Public Management Reform: Building the Republican State, ed. Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira
The Transition to Liberal Democracy. Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira. Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2004. 
14 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl. Summer 1991. “What Democracy I…. And Is Not.” Journal of
Democracy.
15 Edited by Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, 
Democratic Theory  , David Estlund, November 2007. 
Democratization in Southeast Asia  
During much of the 1980s and 90s, 
Southeast Asia was home to a wide range of 
political regimes – from illiberal demo-
cracies to strong authoritarian states – none
of which could be classified as strongly 
democratic. Despite this, the region was
experiencing a sustained period of robust
economic growth. This provoked a debate
among observers about how strongly 
economic growth and democracy were
linked, or whether a link even existed at all. 
Research into the issue at the time found the
relationship between regime type and 
economic growth to be inconclusive.16 More
contemporary scholarship is still unable to 
find a satisfying and complete theory that
can explain regime change and continuity in 
the region.17 
16 Bertrand, Jacques. April 1998. “Review: Growth and Democracy in Southeast Asia.” Comparative Politics 30 
(3): 355-375. 
17 Peou, Sorpong. 2014. “The Limits and Potential of Liberal Democratization in Southeast Asia.” Journal of
Current Southeast Asian Affairs 3: 19-47. 
This led to the development of what
became loosely termed “Asian Values”, a
style of governance combining elements of 
democracy and authoritarianism that was
9
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THE CREEPING HAND OF THE STATE JAMES GUILD 
thought to be uniquely suited to the culture
of Southeast Asia.18 It was essentially a way 
of using culture as an explanatory variable
for the economic success of non-democratic
regimes.19 Donald Emmerson was one of 
the foremost proponents of stretching the
idea of what constituted democracy so that
the concept could be extended to semi-
authoritarian but prosperous regimes, 
writing in 1995 that “observers would do 
well to diversify what they mean by 
democracy beyond its conventionally liberal
form.”20 He elaborated that “even if there
are no quintessentially Asian values…. 
differing societies may democratically 
implement differing views of the relative
importance of social order versus individual
rights.”21 This was criticized as a thin 
rhetorical excuse for justifying abuses of 
state power and not surprisingly, work in the
Journal of Democracy at the time continued 
to espouse the intrinsic value of democracy 
as a system of normative beliefs.22 
For some, this debate was settled 
with the advent of the Asian Financial Crisis
in 1997. The lesson drawn from the crisis by 
advocates of liberal democracy was that
economic growth achieved under non-
democratic regimes was not, in fact, 
sustainable and that much of the past two 
decades of strongmen-led growth had been 
something of an illusion.23 This trium-
phalism was short-lived. Within seven years
of the crisis, authoritarian regimes in the
region were flourishing again while
democracies were struggling.24 As early as
2004, there was evidence that the
consolidation of young democracies in 
Southeast Asia was stagnating and prospects
for continued liberal democratic develop-
ment were poor.25 
18 Neher, Clark D. and Marlay, Ross. 1995. Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The Winds of
Change. Westview Press. See also Dae Jung, Kim. 1994. “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-
Democratic Values.” Foreign Affairs.
19 Caoili, Rachel. 2005. “Reflections on Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: Why do the
Philippines and Singapore differ?” Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and 
Economic Studies 6(2). 
20 Emmerson, Donald. 1995. “Region and Recalcitrance: Rethinking Democracy Through Southeast Asia.” The
Pacific Review 8(2). 
21 Emmerson, Donald. January 1995. “Singapore and the “Asian Values” Debate.” Journal of Democracy 6(4):
95-105. 
22 Ng, Margaret. April 1997. “Why Asia Needs Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 8(2): 10-23.  
23 Thompson, Mark R. October 2001. “Whatever Happened to ‘Asian Values’?” Journal of Democracy 12(4):
154-165. 
24 Thompson, Mark. R. 2004. “Pacific Asia after ‘Asian Values’: Authoritarianism, Democracy, and “Good 
Governance”. Third World Quarterly 25(6): 1079-1095. 
25 Croissant, Aurel. 2004. “From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian Democratization.”
Democratization 11(5): 156-178.   
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Since then, the prognosis for 
democracy in the region has only worsened, 
even as post-crisis economic growth has
remained strong. In 2007, the ASEAN
Charter explicitly called not only for 




    
   
  
 
      
   
    
     
   
    
   
   
  
    
   
   
    
  
   
  
    
   
 
   
   
   
    
   





   
  
  
    
     
   
   
   
    
  
     
    
   
    
     
   
   
      
    
    
   
    
   
    
 
   
 
 
   
  
  
THE CREEPING HAND OF THE STATE JAMES GUILD 
among member states, but also a greater 
commitment to human rights and demo-
cratic norms. Those parts of the Charter 
dealing with human rights and norms have
been largely ignored.26 In 2017, Freedom
House failed to rank any country in 
Southeast Asia as “Free” despite a number 
of nominally democratic regimes in the
region.27 In the Economist Intelligence
Unit's most recent annual assessment of 
freedom across 167 countries, it concluded 
that the Asia-Pacific had "experienced the
biggest decline of any of our seven regions
in 2017" after posting gains in recent
years.28 
In 2015, there was much excitement
when Myanmar held elections for the first
time in twenty five years, freeing Nobel
Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi from years of 
house arrest and allowing her party to 
compete and win in the elections. The
commitment of her government to human 
rights and liberal values has subsequently 
been revealed to be hollow, as Myanmar has
systematically engaged in the persecution 
and displacement of hundreds of thousands
of ethnic Rohingya. As of the publication of 
this article, Thailand is ruled by a military 
junta that has repeatedly used lèse-majesté
laws to arrest dissidents. In the Philippines, 
President Rodrigo Duterte has shown a
wanton disregard for liberal norms, 
officially sanctioning extra-judicial killings
in his hard-nosed war on drugs.29 In 2017, 
the head of Cambodia’s opposition party 
was jailed on treason charges, part of a
larger effort by President Hun Sen to side-
line his political enemies.30 
In this climate, the rosy optimism of 
the 1990s has evaporated. The critical
question to be asking now is why, and 
whether it is irreversible. Diego Fossati and 
Lee Morgenbesser explain this democratic
recession in Southeast Asia mainly as a
result of “policy failure”, and a feeling 
among regular people that elites are still
firmly in control of the levers of power, a
belief that discourages their active partici-
pation in the democratic process.31 
26 Hooi, Khoo Ying. 2017. “ASEAN at 50: A New Test for Democracy in Southeast Asia.” The Diplomat. 
Published May 3. Can be accessed at https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/asean-at-50-a-new-test-for-democracy-
in-southeast-asia/. 
27 Freedom House’s annual reports gauging relative levels of press and social freedoms in the Asia-Pacific can 
be found at https://freedomhouse.org/regions/asia-pacific. 
28 https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/30/economist-intelligence-unit-asias-democracy-ranking-falls-in-2017.html. 
29 Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. 2017. “Extrajudicial Killings Prompt Suit Against Duterte at the International
Criminal Court.” Foreign Policy. April 24. 
30 Hutt, David. 2017. “Death Knell to Cambodian Democracy.” Asia Times. September 4. 
31 Fossati, Diego and Morgenbesser, Lee. 2017. “The Troubling Reality of Southeast Asia’s Democratic
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Tom
Pepinsky argues that the question is more
usefully rephrased not as why is democracy 
failing, but rather why is authoritarianism
enduring? His answer is that what “makes
the politics of disorder a thorny problem for 
Southeast Asian democracy is that these
illiberal policies are popular among many 
citizens. The trend towards illiberal politics
and authoritarian leadership styles is a
  




     
  
  
    
 
     
     
    
     
   
 
   
    
  





    
    
 
    
    
  
      
 
   
  
     
  
    
     
   
 
    
   
   
    
 
 
    
   
   
    
      
    
  
     
    
     
   
   
    
    
    





THE CREEPING HAND OF THE STATE JAMES GUILD 
consequence of the perceived weaknesses of 
democratic politics, which has proven 
unable to eliminate poverty, crime, identity-
based conflict or political instability.”32 
This again highlights the blind spot
experienced by post-Cold War democrati-
zation proponents in their zeal to champion 
Western-style liberal democracy. Demo-
cracy merely promises to provide a means
by which the people, through voting, can 
exercise a measure of control over the
nature and direction of the state. It does not
promise that they will collectively embrace
liberal values; indeed there is every chance
that they may vote for and legitimize
illiberal, discriminatory values. The
American framers of the Constitution were
aware of this inherent weakness in any 
democratic system, and erected structural
barriers designed to serve as a check against
an excess of democracy or demagogues
seizing power by preying on “widespread 
envies, fears, or hopes.”33 
Young democracies, with weaker 
institutions and under-developed state
capabilities, have less of a buffer when it
comes to constraining the populist impulses
of their citizens and preventing authoritarian 
figures from exploiting the envies, fears and 
hopes of the citizenry.34 As such, many 
young democracies are struggling to 
balance the desires and interests of a wide
variety of newly empowered political
actors. This can create opportunities for 
authoritarianism and illiberalism, as demo-
cratic systems are often slow to address
entrenched social and economic problems. 
Indeed, the inability of the state to craft
policies that effectively address the most
pressing needs of the people – alleviating 
hunger and poverty, for instance – can 
create serious liabilities in a young 
democracy with weak institutions. When 
weak democratic institutions of governance
are struggling to deliver on the basic
promises of the Lockean social contract, a
populist demagogue, channelling identity 
politics and offering stability under 
authoritarian rule might seem to be an 
attractive alternative.35 
32 Thomas Pepinsky. 2017. “Democracy Isn’t Receding in Southeast Asia, Authoritarianism is Enduring.” East
Asia Forum. November 4. 
33 Ceaser, James W. 2007. “Demagoguery, Statesmanship, and the American Presidency.” Critical Review: A
Journal of Politics and Society 19(2): 257-298. 
34 See Morris, J., & Polese, A. (Ed.). (2015). Informal economies in post-socialist spaces: Practices, institutions
and networks. Basingstoke: Palgrave; also Hite, K., & Morlino, L. (2004). Problematizing the links between 
authoritarian legacies and ‘good’ democracy’. In K. Hite & P. Cesarini (Eds.), Authoritarian legacies and 
democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe (pp. 25–83). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press. 
35 O’Brien, Thomas. 2016. “Populism, protest and democracy in the twenty-first century.” Contemporary Social
Science 10(4). 
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A detailed look at democratization in 
Indonesia, however, shows that the process
is not so easy to decode as it might seem. 
What at first blush may appear to be
authoritarian back-sliding or the rise of 
illiberal tendencies may in fact be the
democratic process in action, as political
actors square off in the public space to try 
and assert their agendas and interests over 
those of their competitors. This may result
in concessions made to illiberal social
forces, but such concessions are not
  
  
    
   
   
  
  
    
    




    
 
    
   
    
   






   
  
  
   
  
   
    
   




    
   
    
  
   
    
    
     
  
  
    
 
  
    





   
  





   
  
THE CREEPING HAND OF THE STATE JAMES GUILD 
unexpected in democratic societies with 
deep social and political fissures and do not
necessarily sound a death knell for the
consolidation of democratic progress in the
country.  
Democratization in Indonesia  
For over thirty years, Indonesia was
ruled by the authoritarian New Order under 
President Suharto, until the Asian Financial
Crisis precipitated his fall in 1998. In the
face of mass demonstrations and violent
protests, Suharto was replaced by Vice
President B.J. Habibie who between 1998 
and 1999 managed to push through a series
of ambitious reforms that lifted media
restrictions, allowed the formation of polit-
ical parties, and laid out the architecture for 
wide-ranging democratic electoral reforms
including a call for new elections in October 
1999.36 
In 1999, Habibie lost the election to 
Abdurrahman Wahid, an influential
moderate cleric. Wahid’s presidency quickly 
became bogged down by political infighting 
and the newly empowered legislature
moved to impeach him. This resulted in the
creation of the country’s Constitutional
Court, which was imbued with the power to 
interpret and clarify constitutional ambi-
guity and mediate conflicts between the
legislative and executive branches. By 
2002, with the establishment of the
Constitutional Court, the most extensive
portion of the reform process had concluded 
and Indonesia’s political and electoral
system emerged vastly transformed and 
fairly robust.37 
Indonesia’s transition to democracy 
was initially met with optimism. In the late
1990s and early 2000s, the “third wave”
was still ostensibly underway, as a number 
of autocratic and authoritarian regimes
continued transitioning to democracy. 
Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-
majority country, was one of the biggest
dominos to fall and was seen as an exemplar 
of a moderate Islamic democracy, one that
enthusiastically adopted liberal values of 
civic engagement and tolerance.38 
Gradually, this optimism has turned 
to caution. After the transition to demo-
cracy, Indonesia experienced nearly a dec-
ade and a half of stable continuity under the
administrations of Megawati Sukarnoputri
(2001 -2004) and Sus i lo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (2004-2014). Elections were
widely considered to be free and fair, and 
high commodities prices buoyed solid 
economic growth which allowed Indonesia
to enjoy a relatively high level of stability as
it worked toward consolidating its demo-
cracy.39 
36 Crouch, Harold. 2010. Political Reform in Indonesia After Soeharto. Singapore: ISEAS. Chapters 2 and 3. 
37 Mietzner, Marcus. 2010. “Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role
of the Constitutional Court.” Journal of East Asian Studies 10: 397-424. 
38 Hefner, Robert. 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
39 See for instance Abdulkabi, Louay. 2008. Democratisation in Indonesia: From Transition to Consolidation.”
Asian Journal of Political Science 16 (2), 151-172; and Bachelard, Michael. 2014. “Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono's legacy: the great democratic leader who became a follower.” Sydney Morning Herald. October 18. 
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In the 2014 presidential election, 
Joko “Jokowi” Widodo prevailed over 
  
 
   
 
     
  
   
    
   
    
    
   
   
    
   
    
  
   
   
   
  





    
    
  
    
   
    
    
   




    
   
   
   




    
     
   
   
   
     
    
    
   
  
    
 
    
  
      
    
   
   
  
   
  
 
   
       
 
  
THE CREEPING HAND OF THE STATE JAMES GUILD 
Suharto’s former son-in-law, Prabowo 
Subianto. Despite a clear electoral win, 
Prabowo challenged the election results. 
The Constitutional Court functioned as it
was designed, overruling Prabowo’s
spurious challenge and upholding the
legitimacy of the results. Viewed as a test of 
Indonesia’s democratic institutions, this can 
be considered a successful example of their 
robustness, as the Court utilized sound legal
principles to reinforce the legitimacy of 
Jokowi’s electoral mandate.40 However, 
during Jokowi’s term commodities prices
have fallen, exposing some of the deeper 
social, political and economic issues that
were effectively papered-over in times of 
higher growth.  
These include growing inequality, 
ethnic and religious tensions, and rampant
corruption and inefficiency at all levels of 
government. Jokowi has also undertaken an 
ambitious reform agenda designed to reduce
corruption and bureaucratic red-tape, open 
the economy further to foreign investment
and ownership, increase tax revenues and 
develop the country’s lagging infrastructure. 
This agenda, while sound on the merits, is
disruptive and has had the effect of up-
ending the status quo, challenging incum-
bent political and business elites and forcing 
Indonesian citizens to reconcile themselves
to certain burdens that are political
liabilities in a democratic system, such as
paying taxes.  
Jokowi’s administration has under-
performed its infrastructure and economic
growth targets, something that is often 
attributed to the poor quality of gov-
ernance.41 Many lower and middle-class
Indonesians worry that they are losing out
on opportunities that are being taken by 
other members of society.42 This less than 
stellar performance under a liberal demo-
cratic system, and the fears and envy it has
engendered, are creating opportunities for 
conservative elements of society to push 
their own alternative vision for Indonesia. 
Hard-line Islamist groups are increasingly 
using the public space, which is a right
guaranteed to them under a democratic
system, to assert radical and often illiberal
views about the way Indonesian society 
ought to be structured, and the values it
ought to reflect. The most controversial
evidence of this came during Jakarta’s
gubernatorial election in April 2017. In the
run-up to the election, incumbent Governor 
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama was accused of 
blasphemy charges which resulted in an 
enormous public demonstration against him
on December 2, 2016.  
40 Wijaya, Pan Mohamad Faiz Kusuma. 2014. “Prabowo Fights on, but Indonesian Court Ruling Ends Legal
Challenge.” The Conversation. August 27. 
41 Guild, James. 2018. “Jokowinomics vs Reality: A Look at PLN.” New Mandala, April 4. Can be accessed at
http://www.newmandala.org/jokowinomics-vs-reality-look-pln/. 
42 Yasih, Diatyka Widya Permata. 2017. “Jakarta’s Precarious Workers: Are They a ‘New Dangerous Class.” The
Journal of Contemporary Asia 47(1): 27-45. 
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The crowd, organized by cons-
ervative Islamic groups such as the Islamic
Defenders Front Indonesia (Front Pembela 
Islam or FPI), numbered in the hundreds of 
thousands. Ahok, a double minority as an 
ethnic Chinese-Indonesian and a Christian, 
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A scene from the anti-Ahok protest on December 2, 2016. 
 Image: Voice of America/Fathiyah Wardah 
election and shortly thereafter jailed on
blasphemy charges widely considered to be
fraudulent. Research into these events
showed that although the majority of 
Jakartans approved of Ahok’s performance
as governor, they largely voted along ethnic
and religious lines.43 Thus, his performance
as governor was ultimately a less important
determinant than the shrewd exploitation by 
his opponents of identity politics, something 
that is an especially potent political weapon 
in an open democratic system.44 
This set the stage for a showdown 
between the President and a conservative
Islamic organization last year, and the
state’s right to empower itself in restricting 
civil society groups under certain vaguely 
defined conditions prevailed. In July 2017, 
Jokowi issued Presidential Decree No. 
2/2017 on Mass Organizations. With this
Decree, Jokowi empowered the executive
branch to disband civil society organizations
that it deemed a danger to the state, or to be
in conflict with the secular state ideology of 
Pancasila. In the post-1998 reform period, 
Indonesia has erected considerable proce-
dural protections for civil society groups in 
order to ensure a freer and more open 
democratic space in which society can 
challenge the coercive power of the state, 
something Muthia Alagappa has called an 
essential component of a functional
democratic system.   
43 Mietzner, Marcus and Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. 2017. “Ahok’s Satisfied Non-voters: An Anatomy.” New 
Mandala. May 5. Can be accessed http://www.newmandala.org/ahoks-satisfied-non-voters-anatomy/. 
44 Alagappa, Muthiah. 2004. Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Contracting and Expanding Democratic
Space. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
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Prior to the Presidential Decree, a
lengthy legal process was required to 
determine if a mass organization posed a
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sufficiently dire threat to the state to be
banned. By issuing the Decree, Jokowi gave
himself the power to bypass that cumber-
some process and unilaterally declare a
group to be subversive in order to justify 
banning it. This new power was im-
mediately used by the government to ban 
the radical Islamic group Hizb-ut Tahrir
Indonesia (HTI). HTI challenged the ban in 
the Constitutional Court, but the Decree was
passed into official law by the Legislature in 
October 2017.45 
This highlights the slippery slope
that young democracies find themselves
forced to navigate in attempting to locate a
workable equilibrium between stability and 
openness. At first blush, providing the state
with a tool to outlaw a radical Islamic group 
appears to be an uncontroversial move. But
by empowering itself to decide what civil
society organizations are worthy of sharing 
the public space, the state is opening 
something of a Pandora’s Box. There is no 
guarantee that current or future adminis-
trations will not abuse this authority to 
silence their political enemies and critical
media outlets, for instance. Furthermore, as
the Decree allows the state to ban groups
that it considers to be in conflict with the
state ideology, it gives the government
considerable latitude in determining what
the state ideology is and then imposing that
definition on society, a practice which is
generally incompatible with liberal
democratic values.
While the above example of expan-
sion of state power might be defensible, 
other recent developments are more
worrying. The national legislature, the
People’s Representative Council (DPR), 
passed a bill in February of 2018 that would 
allow the DPR to compel anyone who 
“tarnishes the dignity" of the chamber to 
appear before them for questioning. The law
would also provide legislators with legal
ways of obstructing corruption inves-
tigations.46 Around the same time, the DPR 
was also working on a highly controversial
draft bill that would criminalize extra-
marital sexual relationships, although the
LGBT community is considered the real
target of the legislation.47 Other small-scale
examples of state overreach in the public
sphere can be found throughout Indonesia, 
including efforts by multiple provinces and 
municipalities to ban Valentine’s Day on 
religious grounds48 and the recent ques-
tioning by police of a researcher who 
publicly cautioned about the dangers of a
tsunami.49 
45 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 16 Tahun 2017. Can be accessed at http://sipuu.setkab.go.id/ 
PUUdoc/175343/UU%20Nomor%2016%20Tahun%202017.pdf. 
46 Walsh, Michael. 2018. “Indonesian Parliament Passes Controversial Law Targeting Its Critics, Anti-corruption 
Commission.” ABC News. February 28. 
47 Harvey, Adam. 2018. “Indonesia’s LGBT Community Under Threat as Government Sets Sights on Making 
Gay Sex Illegal.” ABC News. January 29. 
48 The Straits Times. 2018. “Goodbye to Romance: Indonesian Cities Ban Valentine's Day.” February 14. 
49 Klemetti, Erik. 2018. “Indonesian Police Questioning Scientist About His Recent Tsunami Study.” Discover. 
April 10. 
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And the most obvious recent
example of conservative religious forces
increasing their influence in the machinery 
of the state was Jokowi’s appointment of 
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conservative cleric Ma’ruf Amin as his
running mate for the 2019 election. Ma’ruf, 
in his role as the chairman of the Indonesian 
Ulama Council (MUI), which is the highest
body in Indonesia for issuing rulings on 
Islamic issues, has been a lightning rod for 
controversy. Under Ma’ruf’s leadership, 
MUI issued a fatwa against the rubella
vaccine and also testified in court that Ahok 
had committed blasphemy, aiding in the
conviction of one of Jokowi’s closest allies. 
This has been widely interpreted as a cold 
political calculation on Jokowi’s part to 
neutralize criticism from conservative
religious groups who might have attacked 
him from the right, as well as a practical
concession necessary to keep NU in his
political coalition.50 But it also raises
serious questions about how influential of a
role Ma’ruf might play in a second Jokowi
administration, and how much ground is
being given up to appease an increasingly 
conservative and influential bloc of con-
servative voters and interest groups.  
All of this is worrying, and rightly 
so, to observers of Indonesia’s democratic
progress. It is not, however, necessarily 
evidence of irreversible authoritarian 
regression or the decline of democracy. That
conservative Islamic groups are inserting 
themselves into and shaping public
discourse is not unexpected in a democratic
country where a large majority of the
population are Muslims, many of whom
adhere to socially conservative values.51 
Indeed, it is a sensible if cynical strategy for 
politicians to court this sizeable electoral
force as Islamic organizations operate some
of the largest and most reliable voter-turnout
operations in the country. On the other hand, 
the largest Islamic political organizations, 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, each 
of which has tens of millions of members, 
both continue to push back against
conservative ideology and publicly call for 
tolerance and pluralism in the country, 
although with varying degrees of success.52 
Likewise, the inertia of public
discourse is not solely trending in an 
illiberal direction. Democratic safeguards in 
Indonesia continue to create and defend 
public space for civil society actors to 
contest powerful and illiberal interests, as
evidenced by the success activist groups
have had in holding up and forcing 
modifications to large development projects
over environmental impact concerns.53 
50 Fealy, Greg. 2018. “Ma’ruf Amin: Jokowi’s Islamic Defender or Deadweight?” New Mandala. August 28. 
51 A survey by Pew Research conducted between 2008-2012 found that 72% of Indonesian Muslims were
supportive of some form of Sharia law. It should be noted that individual understandings of Sharia can vary 
widely and do not necessarily connote the most extreme interpretation. Nevertheless, the results indicate that
conservative religious values are strongly held in Indonesia in general. The report can be accessed: http:// 
assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-
report.pdf. 
52 Arifianto, Alex. 2018. “Islamic Campus Preaching Organizations in Indonesia: Promoters of Moderation or 
Radicalism?” Asian Security. 
53 Mongabay. 2017. “Indonesian Court Revokes Environmental License for the Cirebon Coal Plant Expansion.”
April 25. 
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Demonstrations are a constant fixture at the
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National Monument in the heart of Jakarta, 
and civil society groups are frequently and 
vocally engaged in public discourse.54 They 
may not always prevail in the end, but there
is space for them to voice their opinions and 
contest the power of the state. It is also 
important to point out that there is no 
evidence that elections in Indonesia are not
free and fair, meaning the mechanisms of 
democracy are functioning more or less as
designed. If illiberal values are making it
into legislation, that is because they are
finding a receptive audience in the
electorate.  
In Indonesia illiberal and conserv-
ative social forces are now more openly 
competing in the free market place of ideas
guaranteed to them under a democratic
system. These ideas are finding a receptive
audience for a variety of reasons. This has a
provoked a two-fold response from the
state. First, politicians have begun making 
concessions to these illiberal forces in order 
to secure their support at the ballot box and 
side-line their enemies. Legislation that
targets the LGBT community or the use of 
blasphemy charges to neutralize political
opponents reflects the ascendency of these
kinds of hard-nosed political strategies. 
Secondly, the state has moved to expand its
own power in order to reign in some of 
these more disruptive social forces. So far 
they have only invoked this power to ban 
hard-line and intolerant group that challenge
the state’s legitimacy. But this leaves the
door open for a further expansion of state
JAMES GUILD 
power to clamp down on civil liberties and 
associational freedoms.  
This may not be the vision of liberal
democracy that Francis Fukuyama and 
Larry Diamond once had, but it is a recog-
nizable form of democracy in which a group 
(usually the majority) collectively decide
what direction their society will take. These
are the messy guts of the democratic
process playing out as the country struggles
with the challenges of political and eco-
nomic development. While it is entirely 
possible that the pendulum will ultimately 
swing toward authoritarian back-sliding, or 
that illiberal, hard-line social forces will
become empowered to the point where they 
will seek to banish their enemies through 
violence, that is not currently the situation 
and it is hardly the only or a predestined 
outcome.  
Ultimately, this returns the discus-
sion to just what exactly democracy is and 
what it is not. In this analysis, democracy is
a conceptual tool that provides a platform
for reflecting the beliefs and values of a
particular society. Beliefs and values are not
static, nor are they universally shared by all, 
and as they change the nature of the
democratic system representing them will
also change. Recall Donald Emmerson’s
observation that “differing societies may 
democratically implement differing views
of the relative importance of social order 
versus individual right,” which is surpris-
ingly resonant in today’s political climate.  
54 Savirani, Amalinda. 2017. “Indonesia’s Regions a Test Bed for Civil Society Engagement.” New Mandala. 
April 24. 
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What Emmerson perhaps grasped 
more intuitively than many in the post-Cold 
  
  
    
    
   
  
   
    
   
 
 




   
 
    
    
    








THE CREEPING HAND OF THE STATE JAMES GUILD 
War democratization movement was that 
democracy can function as both a liability 
and an asset. It gives society agency over 
the governing apparatus of the state, and 
guarantees a voice in the governing process. 
But it cannot guarantee what that voice will 
say, or that what it does say will be in lock-
step with Western, liberal notions about 
what democracy is or how it should 
function. Indonesia is still in the process of 
trying to find its democratic voice, and 
while the process is messy and precipitating 
worrisome developments, it is important to 
understand what the process of demo-
cratization actually is, rather than what we
wish it to be. The development of demo-
cracy in Indonesia, a story that is still being 
told, highlights this important distinction.  
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